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			7. Cuba. 8. North Africa.
			9. Africa: Security Council Session.
			10. Visitors in the USSR.
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POLITICAL - INTERNAL

1. Khrushchev in Fine Fettle.

The virtually unanimous observation of both US and British delegation members, participating in the test-ban treaty signing, was that KHRUSHCHEV was healthy, full of energy, well-preserved for his age, and seemingly unpreoccupied with any serious problems. The contrast was marked with several of his appearances earlier this year when he gave the appearance of extreme lassitude, irritation, and frustrated disgust prior to taking leave in the south. He left for the Black Sea area on Tuesday where the Secretary is visiting him on Thursday and Friday.

Celebration of the Kursk campaign culminated this week after a month of buildup, and Khrushchev came in for final round of adulation although some of the articles by military leaders were restrained. MALINOVSKY, writing in Pravda on August 5, makes only passing reference to Khrushchev's participation in a staff meeting on the Central Front and quotes him later, but in a current context. The Malinovsky article, like his piece for the Stalingrad anniversary, attempts to give a balanced picture of how war plans were formulated by collective discussion and not by STALIN alone. He and ROKOSSOVSTI (in Red Star, August h) also give the high command in Moscow and the front commanders and staffs due credit (Marshal MOSKALENKO, in contrast, in Selskaya zizn, August 13, cites the presence of Marshal G. K. ZHUKOV as Deputy Supreme Commander and his proposal at a Sixth Guards Army meeting planning the counterattack, and indicates that Zhukov would not support Moskalenko's proposal, but insisted on sticking to the plan of the Supreme Command's Stavka). Other military leaders for the most part (SOKOLOVSKY excepted) referred briefly to Knrushchev's activities with Rokossovsky, ZAKHAROV, and ROTHISTROV perhaps mentioning Khrushcher the most. Many more and varied pictures of Khrushchev at the front were published than for the Stalingrad anniversary, and one article in Red Star on August 3, by Lt. Gen. PLYASKIN, cites Khrushchev's initiative in laying a system of highly successful minefields near Belgorod, reminiscent of his "clever" endeavor of the same sort in evacuating Kharkov (see WEEKA No. 6, February 8, 1963).

The press on August 3 revealed that Khrushchev addressed an August 1-2 meeting in the Supreme Council of the National Economy on the subject of planning and capital construction for 1964-5. Remarks were made by Gosplan head LOMAKO, USSR Sovnarkhoz head DYMSHITS, Gosstroi heai NOVIKOV, and RUDNEV, Chairman of the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research, but no reference was made to Supreme Council Chairman USTINOV, who presumably chaired the meeting. The press item noted that participants in the meeting gave "concrete examples" of the correctness of Khrushchev's proposals in this field.

More than half of the full members of the Fresidium were not present at the signing of the test-ban treaty. VORONGT apparently left town to make an agricultural banner award in Vologda, and, along with KOZLOV and MIKOYAN, who are hospitalized, KOSYGIN, KUUSINEN, POLYANSKI, SUSLOV, and SHVERNIK were absent as during the previous week. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. US Senators Meet with Supreme Soviet Officials.

On August 6, the six United States Senators who accompanied the Secretary to Moscow (Senators AIKEN, FULBRIGHT, SALTONSTALL, SPARKMAN, HUMPHREY, and PASTORE)

met in the Kremlin with ranking officials of the Supreme Soviet, the first such meeting between members of Congress and officials of the Soviet "parliament". During the meeting, conducted on a friendly basis, the Soviet officials spoke out for further exchanges with the Congress. Senator Fulbright told I. V. SPIRIDONOV (Chairman of the Soviet of the Union) after the meeting that he was not empowered to extend any invitation on behalf of the Senate. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

3. Meeting of European Community of Writers in Leningrad.

A meeting of the European Community of Writers devoted to the modern novel opened in Leningrad August 5, with representation from Western, as well as Eastern, Europe. The Soviet press has printed speeches of several of the Soviet delegates, including Leonid LEONOV, Aleksei SURKOV, Konstantin SIMONOV, Konstantin FEDIN, and Mikhail SHOLOKHOV, but no information is available on speeches reported to have been made August 7 by Ilya EHRENBURG and Vasily AKSYONOV. Given the forum, the published speeches understandably do not stress the current Farty line of "no peaceful coexistence with bourgeois ideology," and it seems clear from their remarks that the speakers apparently sought to convince the delegates that Soviet fiction belongs in the mainstream of European literature. Soviet writers' subservience to the Party is ignored and only mild words are said about the writer's responsibility to society; Pedin speaks against "the attempt to raise up almost everywhere in the West the banner ... of JOYCE, PROUST, KAFKA". Surkov's statement that the participation of older (Fedin, etc.), as well as younger (Aksyonov) writers would prove to the delegates that "we are united in our understanding of the historical tasks of Soviet literature, " suggests that Aksyonov or Ehrenburg could be trusted to say nothing startling. (UNCLASSIFIED)

4. New Controls on Theaters.

Minister of Culture E. A. FURTSEVA, in an interview published in <u>Sovetskaya</u> <u>kultura</u> August 8, announced that as a follow-up to the June Central Committee on <u>ideological</u> questions, special repertory and editing collegiums would be established "to help shape the repertory of theaters." Special "help" would also be given to theaters intended for youthful audiences, including the Moscow <u>Sovremennik</u> ("Contemporary") rumored about to be closed last season for its relatively daring repertory. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

POLITICAL - EXTERNAL

5. Test-Ban Agreement.

Signature of the nuclear test-ban agreement August 5 dominated the week's diplomatic activity in Moscow. It also helped to provide a peg for the USSR's continuing effort to (1) paint the agreement as a triumph for Soviet policy, (2) maintain pressure against the Western signatories for conclusion of a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression agreement and, clearly most important, (3) associate the USSR and Soviet "peace policies" with world-wide hopes for peace and with the best interests of all mankind, largely in order further to isolate Communist China on an issue on which it is proving highly vulnerable.

The signing ceremony, presided over by a beaming Khrushchev, followed separate morning meetings for the American and British delegations with Khrushchev and

Foreign Minister GROMIKO and a luncheon for the two visiting delegations (and UN Secretary General U THANT) at which Khrushchev was host. The signing itself was followed by a Kremlin reception at which Khrushchev delivered a speech in which he lauded the agreement and its signatories—mainly the USSR—and called for further effort to achieve peace, listing as the first step conclusion of a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty. In brief statements during the signing ceremony, the Secretary of State and the two Foreign Ministers, as well as U Thant, expressed the hope that conclusion of the agreement would be followed by further efforts to resolve international problems.

The agreement was signed August 8 in Moscow by representatives of 22 governments, including the foreign ministers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Mongolia, and the GDR, and the deputy foreign minister of Poland, all of whom had made a special trip to Moscow for the signing.

Heavy press play was given during the week to letters and statements from foreign officials, governments, and Communist parties, the Pope and the Patriarch, as well as reviews of the foreign press, all in support of the agreement, many lauding the role of the USSR, and all calculated to reflect the universality of favorable reaction.

A major government statement published August 4, as well as lead articles in Pravda August 5 and 3, hailed the agreement as a "triumph" for the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. These various statements sought to clothe the Soviet leadership in the robe of champion of all peace-loving peoples, and emphasized how the Soviet position had received full support from the "overwhelming majority" of socialist countries as well as widespread approval in other areas. They then moved to attack the Communist Chinese for their opposition (see below), with only an oblique reference to the negative attitude of France and an increasing emphasis on the lack of enthusiasm shown by Bonn.

In addition to its important role in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the test-ban agreement is being used by the Soviets to demonstrate both the correctness and the success of Soviet policy on a world scale. The Soviets can be expected in the coming months to exploit the dramatic impact of the agreement itself, the atmosphere of hope and relief which it is creating, and the boost for "peaceful coexistence" resulting from achievement of a major East-West agreement. Whether they will go beyond their present "peace offensive" to constructive consideration of other East-West issues remains to be seen. In this connection, we note that except for Khrushchev's reference to the NATO-Warsaw powers nonaggression pact, the recent Soviet proposals for East-West agreement have not been repeated in recent days. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

6. Sino-Soviet Relations.

Moscow showed its preoccupation with its quarrel with Peiping by filling its press with all manner of polemical articles. Chinese opposition to the nuclear test-ban treaty has provided Moscow with the most effective stick to date with which to thrash MAO's pretensions to leadership of the world Communist movement. The Soviets indicated by the harsh, confident tone of a Government Declaration (August 3-4 press), commenting on Peiping's July 31 statement attacking the test-ban treaty, that it considers that the Chinese have been maneuvered into a corner

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over this issue. While being careful to focus attention on their own "broad program to strengthen peace," the Soviets did not appear to consider that the Chinese proposal for a world disarmament conference represented any serious challenge to Soviet leafership of the "world struggle for peace." The Soviet Declaration dismissed the July 31 CP statement as an obvious effort to divert attention from the basic fact of Chinese opposition to the test-ban treaty.

Understandably, the Soviet press has tried to present the ninth "Ban the Bomb" Conference at Hiroshima as a triumph for the Soviet delegation. The majority of the participants, according to Pravda August 6 rejected efforts by "rightists and Trotskyites" to disrupt the meeting, and many delegates were said to have left their places when the Chinese tried to "destroy the atmosphere of unity" which prevailed.

The Soviet Declaration and related polemical materials elaborated a number of familiar themes: (1) the isolation of the CPR. The Pravda lead article (August 5) underscored the point by citing approving messages from Afro-Asian leaders. A Rangoon despatch mockingly attacked the Chinese for treating "one provincial news-paper" opposing the test-ban as representative of Burmese opinion. Special Declarations issued by the Czechoslovak and British CP's also attacked the July 31 CCP Declaration; (2) the fact that the Chinese "leaders," by attacking the test-ban, are in effect supporting the efforts of the "most reactionary, militarist" circles to maintain tension and promote the nuclear arms race; (3) the "unprecedented fact" that the Chinese Communists have deliberately set themselves up against the world Communist movement, thereby damaging not only the "struggle for peace," but also Communist unity.

In obvious rebuttal to the Chinese argument that the agreement weakened the socialist camp militarily and that nuclear weapons in socialist hands are a "contribution to peace," the Soviet Declaration stressed Soviet military superiority, asserting that the Soviet "nuclear rocket shield protects the security of all socialist countries, including the CPR." While this observation is probably designed to discount the need for the CPR to develop its own nuclear "shield," it could also be read to mean that Peiping would forego Soviet protection if it insisted on developing a "shield," of its own. The Hungarian newspaper Nepszabadsag was quoted to the effect that socialist countries should see their security in the "atomic and missile superiority" of the USSR.

The most striking feature of present Soviet press coverage on the Chinese attitude is the tone of scorn and impatience, coupled with a further elaboration of charges of misbehavior. In publishing the CCP July 31 Declaration in the same issue with its own Declaration, the Soviet press described the Declaration as a "pretentious, chameful document," unworthy to appear in the Soviet press. The Declaration queried how far the Chinese leaders propose to go, in the light of the fact that they show not a "grain of respect for the sovereignty of the Soviet state," and "lose their nerve" to a point where they try even to turn the Soviet people against their government. In a similar vein, a speech by KADAR, reprinted in Pravda (Lugust 8), accused the Chinese of interfering in the internal affairs of the Hungarian Party, and especially of distributing the June 14 CCP letter despite the protests of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. A Bulgarian Declaration (Pravda

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August 6) raised the now familiar charge involving state relations that the Chinese were responsible for a five-fold drop in trade over a two to three year period.

On the question of fractional activity in other parties, Pravda (August 6) quoted a Emanite attack on the Chinese for encouraging "renegades" excluded from the French CP, and spoke of the formation of a separate "Franco-Chinese People's Association. The Bulgarian Declaration in the same Prayda issue asserted that it was the "elementary duty of every Communist" to defend the CPSU from attack by enemies and "every kind of fractions." A Swiss Communist is quoted by Pravda (August 4) as saying that "there has not yet been such an example of fractionist and splitting activity" in the world Communist movement.

Next to the nuclear test-ban issue, the Soviet polemics focused during the week on the question of the national liberation struggle and its alleged dependence for success on the support of the Soviet bloc. The question was discussed in a striking article by CHERNYAEV in the August 3 Pravda, entitled "Socialism, the Principal Force of the World Revolutionary Movement". The August 7 Pravda devoted its lead article and another full page to the subject, with particular stress on the importance of economic assistance to developing countries in this stage of the "liberation" struggle, and Soviet ability to provide aid in deed as well as word. Chernyaev, in his polemical attack, challenged the claim to leadership in the revolution of the Afro-Asian and Latin American areas, where the "proletariat is far from being formed into a class.* The Chinese are accused of seeking to discourage the new states from looking to the USSR as other than a source of economic support.

COMMENT: In his strong implication that the Chinese/opposed to peaceful coexistence because they see the USSR being the first target of attack in another

war, Chernyaev went further than any commentator thus far to depict the Chinese as a major energy of the Soviet people. This charge, in the context of the other attacks on the Chinese, serves to bring home to the Soviet people the tenuous character of their state as well as Party relations. A withdrawal of ambassadors would seem a logical development at this stage of the dispute, but the traditional reluctance to make the first move and thus risk the onus of further accentuating the conflict may delay this development for some time. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

7. Cuba.

Soviet propaganda continued to point to Cuba as an inspiring example of Soviet success in aiding national-liberation movements, Chinese propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding. The Cuban press was reported to have printed the full texts of the June and July letters of the CCP and CPSU, and TASS stories cited the strong support of the Cuban people for the limited test-ban treaty.

Most interesting was the report on their Havana trip by chief editors A. I. ADZHUBEI of Izvestiya and P. A. SATYUKOV of Pravda and general director D. P. GORYUNOV of TASS. They returned to Moscow August 2 after representing the USSR at the tenth anniversary of the Cuban uprising, and their report appeared in Pravda and Izvestiya on August 7. It deals primarily with CASTRO's speech of July 26. The main point of the article--which had to be interpolated by the authors, since Castro did not include it in his speech -- is how the reality of revolutionary Cuba

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gives the lie to Chinese charges that the Soviet Union "capitulated before imperialism." The article accuses the Chinese Communists of forgetting Marxism and attempting to say that the "three A's"-Asia, Africa, and (Latin) America-have close ties only with each other and have nothing in common with peoples of other countries and continents. The three authors write: "True, when Fidel Castro said that in their revolutionary struggle the peoples of Latin America find their true commade and friend in the person of the great Motherland of LENIN, and the square in one burst of warm applause greeted this thought of their leader, the Chinese delegates didn't even take their hands out of their pockets."

The reference in the sentence quoted was the only one in the article to Latin American revolution "on the Guban model," which was the major theme of the Castro July 26 speech. It is noteworthy that Adzhubei, Goryunov, and Satyukov played down both this aspect and also the rather vehement anti-Americanism of Castro's speech. The points they chose to emphasize were: Cuba's willingness and ability to repel any attacks; the "victory of the peace policy" of the USSR represented by the test-ban treaty; the achievements and willingness to work of the Cuban people, building socialism; and-especially—the brotherly support extended to Cuba by the Soviet Union. The authors even thought they could hear the vast crowd shouting: "Fidel--Khrushchev, we're with you!" (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

8. North Africa.

A spate of stories in the central press about North Africa during the week illustrated Soviet opportunities and difficulties in that area: on the one hand, useful words from Algerian Premier BEN BELLA about Soviet peace policy; on the other, evidence of the difficult position of the Communist Parties in the Maghreb.

Pravda managed to carry four statements from Ben Bella-two from Bamako and two from Dakar-praising the limited test-ban treaty. Pravda also noted his remarks against Portugal and South Africa in Dakar, and his joint communique with President KEITA of Mali lauding the "socialist path of development of the economy" chosen by the two countries. Support for Soviet policies also came from Ali YATA, Morocco's veteran Communist Party leader, in a Pravda article (August 3). In a statement on the 60th anniversary of the II Congress of the RSDLP, Yata stressed the USSR's strong support of the young Asian and African countries in the struggle against imperialism and for full independence.

An article by the long-time leader of the Communist Party of Algeria, Larbi BOUHALI, entitled "To Create a Revolutionary Front of All Patriots," was reprinted from Algier Republicain in Pravda of August h. (Neither Yata nor Bouhali were identified with the Communist Party, although both were called "commade." Bouhali referred to Ben Bella as "brother.") Bouhali defended Ben Bella against criticisms made by sectors of the French press and by "certain Algerian political figures." The author admitted that the government had made mistakes, and that a serious political crisis had not been overcome within the FLN, but in the light of all the difficulties faced by the regime he said that the revolution's first year in power could be viewed with pride. Bouhali wrote that the great majority of the people supported the activities of the government—although some criticism was still in order. Implicitly admonishing Ben Bella for his attitude toward the

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Algerian CP, Bouhali concluded that the unity of action of all patriots could best be obtained in a united revolutionary front.

Bouhali spoke from a Communist Party in a country for which the Soviets no doubt have considerable hopes. A different story appeared about the Communist Party of Tunisia. Under the headline "Witch Hunt in Tunisia," Pravda (August 9) carried a <u>Humanite</u> story about the persecutions now suffered by Communists and other "progressive" Tunisians. This "police repression," says TASS, gives a good notion of "socialism of the Neo-Destour type." BOURGUIBA stands for no opposition to his policies, "even though he knows they are dictated by Washington."

COMMENT: The varying treatment of Algeria and Tunisia illustrates nicely how Moscow is prepared to overlook the problems faced by local Communists when the local government is regarded as useful by the Soviet Union. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

9. Africa: Security Council Session.

Surprisingly enough, Soviet central press coverage of the Security Council session was light during the week. The resolutions on Portugal and South Africa were not emphasized. In fact the South Africa resolution was merely mentioned in passing in a feuilleton in Izvestiya (August 8) describing the sale of do-it-yourself tear gas bombs for use against unruly blacks in South Africa. The feuilleton pointed out that a group of countries, including the US, England, and France, succeeded in eliminating the boycott provision from the resolution. "The racists of South Africa," the author noted, "are not alone." Izvestiya (August 7) also reported Soviet representative FEDORENKO's speech briefly, including his statement that South Africa's violations of UN principles in effect deprived the country of the right to be a UN member. But Pravda did not report on the debate or the resolution.

A Pravda item (August 3) notes that since Morocco and Togo have now joined the Organization of African Unity the group now includes "all independent states of Africa." Apparently South Africa has become in Pravda's eyes an un-country. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

10. Visitors in the USSR.

Test-Ban Treaty: The American and British delegations, led by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister, arrived in Moscow August 3 for the signing of the treaty August 5. UN Secretary-General U Thant arrived August h. Later in the week the foreign ministers of Mongolia and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe (in the case of Poland, the deputy foreign minister) arrived to sign the treaty on behalf of their governments.

Party Delegations: The Indonesian CP delegation led by Central Committee Chairman D. N. AIDIT, returned to Moscow from Havana on August 2, and departed for Berlin on August 6. An Austrian CP delegation, led by CPA Secretary I. KOPLENIG, arrived August 3. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Chile, L. CORVALAN, was received by BREZHNEV and PONOMAREV on August 6. Two

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leaders of the Australian CP, Central Committee Chairman R. DIXON and General Secretary L. SHARKEY, were reported in Moscow on August 7. A delegation of women from the Canadian CP, in the USSR to become acquainted with Party organization and the role of women, arrived during the week. At the invitation of the CPSU, a group of weterans of the Vietnam Lao Dong (Workers) Party arrived in Moscow August 7 for rest and to acquaint themselves with the achievements of Communist construction in the USSR. They were met at the railway station by a group of Old Bolsheviks. The delegation of the Swedish Labor Party which has been in the USSR since July 14, headed by Central Committee member Roger DAFION, left Moscow for Sweden on August 4.

Somalian Prime Minister: The Prime Minister of Somalia, Abdi Rashid Ali SHEMARKS, arrived in Moscow August 2 and left the next day for Peking. Khrushchev gave a dinner for Shirmarke August 2, but his visit got little press notice. It was noted that he was in Moscow "in transit."

Nehru, R. K.: The General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India, R. K. NEHRU, held a press conference on August 2 in Moscow, using the occasion to praise the test-ban treaty and Soviet aid to India.

Parliamentarians: The Colombian parliamentary delegation, in the Soviet Union since July 21, left August 3 for Peking. It was led by the Chairman of the House of Representatives, Dr. Jose A. LOPEZ. (UNCLASSIFIED)

MILITARY - ARMY

1. Nuclear Weapons in Orbit.

An article appeared in the August 8 edition of Red Star, which gave a resume of US efforts in the field of nuclear armed vehicles in outer space. The article concluded by stating that perfection of such a vehicle would not be an advantage to the West.

COMMENT: While it is essentially an "expose" of US activities in the military field, the article contains a hint of Soviet work in the same field. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. FRG "Militarism".

On August 9, Red Star editorialized Secretary of Defense MacNAMARA's visit to Bonn, which was followed closely in the Soviet press during the past week. The Soviets pointed out that the visit was made at the time when the test-tan treaty was being signed in Moscow and that the results of the visit demonstrated the rise of the West German military threat. The Soviets also indicated that Bonn would most likely have a greater part in the cold war. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

For the Ambassador:

Malcolm Toon Counselor for Political Affairs

Madeulin Won